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BIVENS AND WARD—CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA
ABSTRACT
Despite the killing of an unarmed fifteen-year-old boy by a federal border
patrol agent, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hernandez v. Mesa refused to allow a
Bivens cause of action to proceed and left an egregious violation of
constitutional rights unremedied. The U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in Ziglar v.
Abbasi and Hernandez v. Mesa further limited the Bivens cause of action in
such a way that makes successfully suing federal officials for constitutional
violations practically impossible. The Supreme Court frequently denies Bivens
claims due to the purported availability of alternative remedies. However, the
Court’s recent jurisprudence makes clear that these alternative remedies do not
need to be as effective as a remedy under Bivens, nor do they even need to be
certain to exist. Thus, the supposed availability of alternative remedies in the
United States often leaves individuals with no remedy at all. On the other hand,
the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to constitutional remedies, outlined
in Vancouver (City) v. Ward, functionally analyzes the availability and
adequacy of alternative remedies, which increases a plaintiff’s chance of
obtaining effective relief. The U.S. Supreme Court should adopt portions of
Canada’s functional approach and consider the absence of alternative remedies
an important factor in deciding to extend a Bivens claim to a new context. This
will enhance the protection of constitutional rights in the United States and
prevent individuals from being left without a remedy after their rights have been
violated by a federal official.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the tragic killing of an unarmed fifteen-year-old boy by a federal
border patrol agent, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hernandez v. Mesa refused to
allow a Bivens cause of action to proceed and left an egregious violation of
constitutional rights unremedied.1 The U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in Ziglar
v. Abbasi and Hernandez v. Mesa further limited the Bivens cause of action in
such a way that makes successfully suing federal officials for constitutional

1

Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
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violations practically impossible.2 The Supreme Court frequently denies Bivens
claims due to the purported availability of alternative remedies.3 However, the
Court’s recent jurisprudence makes clear that these alternative remedies do not
need to be as effective as a remedy under Bivens,4 nor do they even need to be
certain to exist.5 Thus, the supposed availability of alternative remedies in the
United States often leaves individuals with no remedy at all.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to constitutional
remedies, outlined in Vancouver (City) v. Ward, functionally analyzes the
availability and adequacy of alternative remedies,6 thereby increasing a
plaintiff’s chance of obtaining effective relief. The rights–remedies gap in the
United States is not inevitable. As the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach
demonstrates, it is possible to show attentiveness to the availability of alternative
remedies without closing the door of federal courts to victims of lawlessness.
The U.S. Supreme Court should follow Canada’s lead and consider the absence
of alternative remedies an important factor in deciding to extend a Bivens claim
to a new context. Specifically, the Court should consider a more functional
approach in line with the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach in Vancouver
(City) v. Ward.7 This will enhance the protection of constitutional rights in the
United States and prevent individuals from being left without a remedy after
their rights have been violated by a federal official.
I.

BIVENS CLAIM JURISPRUDENCE

A. The Rise of Bivens
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
the U.S. Supreme Court implied a damages cause of action against federal
officials for constitutional violations for the first time.8 Bivens brought suit in
federal court for damages against Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents who had
arrested him and searched his home without probable cause or a warrant in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.9 In its analysis, the Court indicated that
2

See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. 735.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CAL. L. REV. 933, 951–52 (2019).
4
Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens After
Minneci, 90 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 1473, 1486 (2013) (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386 (1983)).
5
See Leah Litman, Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 CAL. L. REV. 1477, 1509–10 (2018).
6
Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28, para. 24 (Can.).
7
Id.
8
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
9
Id. at 389. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides citizens with the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3
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there were no “special factors counselling hesitation”10 and “no explicit
congressional declaration”11 that prohibited a damages remedy or required an
individual in these circumstances to seek redress through “another remedy,
equally effective in the view of Congress.”12 In upholding his claim for damages,
the Court stated that “where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies
so as to grant the necessary relief.”13 Justice Harlan, concurring in the judgment,
emphasized that a damages remedy was important in this situation because “[f]or
people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”14
The Supreme Court then expanded the Bivens cause of action to two new
contexts in Davis v. Passman and Carlson v. Green.15 In these two cases, the
Supreme Court extended Bivens to encompass damages claims against federal
officials for violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause16 and
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.17 In Davis
v. Passman, the Court held that a damages action was appropriate against a U.S.
congressman who had fired his female assistant because of her gender in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.18 Again, the Court indicated that there were
no “special factors counselling hesitation”19 and “no explicit congressional
declaration”20 that individuals in the plaintiff’s position were prohibited from
seeking a damages remedy against a responsible official.21 Importantly, the
Court emphasized the absence of alternative remedies and applied Justice
Harlan’s wisdom from Bivens that for this plaintiff it was also “damages or
nothing.”22
In Carlson v. Green, the Court considered whether the Constitution provided
a damages remedy for a violation of the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights

10

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
Id. at 397.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
14
Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
15
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
16
Davis, 442 U.S. at 228.
17
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 14.
18
Davis, 442 U.S. at 228.
19
Id. at 245.
20
Id. at 246 (alteration in original).
21
Id. at 246–47.
22
Id. at 245 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)). In Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, the Court expressly stated that
the Court in Davis v. Passman “inferred a new right of action chiefly because the plaintiff lacked any other
remedy for the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 (2001).
11
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despite the fact that a suit could be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) against the United States.23 The Court held that Bivens claims are not
precluded by a remedy under the FTCA.24 In fact, the Court emphasized that in
an appropriate case, an individual could have a Bivens claim against the
individual officials who violated their constitutional rights and also a FTCA
claim against the United States.25 The Court reasoned that Congress knows how
to explicitly state when it desires that the FTCA be an exclusive remedy,26 and
that Bivens offered a more effective remedy than the FTCA in this case.27 The
Court highlighted three reasons why Bivens offered a more effective remedy
than the FTCA. Specifically, Bivens claims offered an individual, deterrent
effect;28 the availability of punitive damages;29 and the potential for a jury.30
Finally, the Court noted that “an action under [the] FTCA exists only if the State
in which the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action[.]”31
Since the “FTCA [was] not a sufficient protector of the citizens’ constitutional
rights,”32 the Court upheld the action for damages under the Eighth
Amendment.33

B. The Tide Turns34
Through 1980, the Bivens claim seemed to be on a steady path of expansion
in part due to the Court’s “narrow conception”35 of those “special factors
counselling hesitation[.]”36 However, since Carlson v. Green, the Supreme
Court has refused to recognize a Bivens cause of action in every relevant case
that has come before it.37 The Court has based its rejection of Bivens claims in

23

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16–17 (1980).
Id. at 23.
25
See id.
26
See id. The Court noted that Congress provided an explicit statement that the FTCA was an exclusive
remedy in a number of statutes. Id. at 20.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 21.
29
Id. at 22.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 23.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 17–18.
34
SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 33 (5th ed. 2020).
35
Fallon, supra note 3, at 950.
36
Id.; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
37
Fallon, supra note 3, at 950.
24
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most of these cases on either the presence of “special factors counselling
hesitation”38 or its identification of alternative remedies provided by Congress.39
In Chappell v. Wallace, the Court held that enlisted military personnel are
not entitled to bring a Bivens claim against their superior officers for alleged
constitutional violations.40 In so holding, the Court emphasized the presence of
“special factors counselling hesitation[.]”41 Specifically, these factors included
the unique relationship between military personnel and their superior officers,42
the military’s separate disciplinary system,43 and the Constitution’s express
grant of military powers to Congress.44 The Court’s holding was broad and
completely ruled out the possibility that enlisted military personnel would ever
be able to maintain a Bivens claim against a superior officer.45
In Bush v. Lucas, an aerospace engineer brought a Bivens action against his
supervisor alleging that he was demoted in retaliation for his First Amendment
protected speech.46 The Supreme Court rejected the Bivens claim because the
aerospace engineer had an alternative remedy through the congressionally
created Civil Service Commission.47 The Court refused to supply a judiciallycreated remedy in this case because Congress protected federal employees from
such retaliatory actions through “an elaborate, comprehensive scheme that
encompasses substantive provisions forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors
and procedures . . . by which improper action may be redressed.”48 The Court
determined that the Civil Service Commission’s remedial scheme “provide[d]
meaningful remedies for employees”49 and that the aerospace engineer’s First
Amendment claim was “fully cognizable”50 under this scheme. However, the
Court also recognized that those “existing remedies [did] not provide complete
relief[.]”51 In Bush, the Court “showed greater deference to congressional action
by requiring only that congressionally created remedies be ‘meaningful,’

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 951–52; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
Fallon, supra note 3, at 951–52; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 304.
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
Id. at 390.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 381, 386.
Id.
Id. at 381, 388 (emphasis added).
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moving away from the requirement that alternative remedies be ‘viewed as
equally effective’ to a Bivens claim.”52
Similarly, in Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Court considered whether
individuals had a Bivens claim against the federal officials who wrongfully
denied their Social Security benefits and violated their due process rights.53 The
Court rejected the Bivens claim because Congress had already provided
individuals who had been wrongfully denied Social Security benefits with
“meaningful”54 redress through the Social Security’s administrative system.55
Furthermore, individuals who had exhausted these administrative remedies were
then able to seek judicial review of the denial of their benefits,56 including
review of any constitutional claims the individuals had in regard to such denial.57
In this “elaborate”58 scheme, Congress did not provide for damages against
individual officers who violated constitutional rights through the wrongful
denial of benefits.59 Since “congressional attention”60 has been “frequent and
intense”61 in rectifying issues stemming from the wrongful denial of benefits,
the Court determined that it had no room to provide an additional judicial
remedy.62
In 2001, the Court put a twist on the alternative remedies analysis of Bivens
by implying that the availability of state-law tort claims precluded a plaintiff’s
Bivens action.63 In Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, a federal
inmate sought damages for Eighth Amendment violations from a private
corporation contracted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons to house inmates.64 The
Court held that a Bivens claim could not lie against a corporate entity contracted
52
Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 1486 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 386; Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 19 (1980)).
53
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
54
Id. at 423.
55
Id. at 424–25.
56
Id. at 424.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 425.
59
Id. at 424.
60
Id. at 435.
61
Id. Congress specifically addressed the issue of the wrongful denial of benefits by enacting emergency
legislation which caused individuals to continue to receive their benefits upon review of a state agency’s finding
of ineligibility. Id. Less than two years later, Congress again targeted this issue with legislation revising the
program and its review process. Id. at 425–26.
62
Id. at 429. The Court emphasized that “[w]hether or not [it] believe[s] that [Congress’s] response was
the best response, Congress is the body charged with making the inevitable compromises required in the design
of a massive and complex welfare benefits program.” Id.
63
Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 1487; Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001).
64
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 63; Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 1486–87.

PRINCE_7.11.22

358

7/11/2022 10:47 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

by the federal government,65 just as a Bivens claim could not lie against a federal
agency.66 The Court reemphasized that “the purpose of Bivens is to deter the
officer[.]”67 Allowing suits against the entity itself would encourage aggrieved
individuals to bring damages claims against the entity rather than the employee
who committed the constitutional violation.68 Although the case seemed to be
decided when the Court held that corporate entities were not suable under
Bivens, the Court did not stop here.69 The Court further indicated that a Bivens
claim was foreclosed in this situation because the plaintiff had alternative
remedies under the Administrative Remedy Program of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons and under state tort law.70 Prior to Malesko, however, the Court indicated
that state tort claims were not adequately protective of constitutional rights.71
For this reason, the Court’s analysis in Malesko “raise[d] the further question of
whether the existence of alternative federal remedies, alternative state-law
remedies, or both working in conjunction barred Mr. Malesko’s Bivens [sic]
claim.”72
In Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court seemed to address the above issues raised in
the Malesko decision.73 The Court ultimately decided not to extend the Bivens
cause of action in this case based on “judicial-manageability grounds,”74 which
fits within the analysis of whether the case presents any “special factors
counselling hesitation[.]”75 However, in the context of alternative state
remedies, the Court indicated “that state-law remedies will bar a Bivens [sic]
claim only if the Court concludes that Congress intended to rely upon state-law
remedies as an alternative remedy.”76 Thus, it seems the Court’s purpose in

65

Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71.
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–86 (1994).
67
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980)).
68
Id. at 71. Since a system that encourages suits against the entity rather than the individual would not
deter the individual officers, the Court reasoned that “the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost.”
Id. at 69 (quoting Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485).
69
Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 1486–87 (reasoning that, because the “no-entity-liability
principle” decided the case, the Court’s state-law tort remedy analysis was dicta).
70
Id.; Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72–74.
71
Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 1487–88 (referring to the Court’s analysis in Bivens and Carlson).
72
Id. at 1489.
73
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
74
Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 1489.
75
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971); Reinert
& Mulligan, supra note 4, at 1489; Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 554.
76
Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 1489 (citing Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 554). Specifically, the Court
stated, “[The] redress open to [the plaintiff] are . . . an assemblage of state and federal, administrative and judicial
benches applying regulations, statutes and common law rules. It would be hard to infer that Congress expected
the Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand . . . .” Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 554.
66
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analyzing alternative state remedies is to ascertain whether Congress wanted the
Court to utilize such remedies instead of implying a Bivens cause of action.77
C. Recent Bivens Jurisprudence
1. Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017)
The Court’s approach reflects “an increasingly assertive hostility”78 to
Bivens claims, and the Court has only continued to restrict the doctrine.79
Furthermore, Justices Scalia and Thomas have argued that Bivens and its
progeny “should be limited ‘to the precise circumstances that they involved.’”80
In Ziglar v. Abbasi, respondents sought damages against high-level
Executive Branch officials after being arrested and detained for an extended
period of time on immigration charges following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.81 Respondents, like hundreds of other Arab immigrants,82
were being held on orders by the U.S. government “[p]ending a determination
whether a particular detainee had connections to terrorism[.]”83 Respondents
alleged the deprivation of their substantive due process rights, violation of their
equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment, and other violations of their
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.84 Among other things, respondents were
subject to detention in their “tiny cells for over 23 hours a day[,]”85 frequent strip
searches, and severe “physical and verbal abuse” by the prison guards.86
The Court noted that while the term “special factors counselling hesitation”87
has yet to be defined,88 “[t]he necessary inference . . . is that the inquiry must
concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action
or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a
damages action to proceed.”89 Furthermore, the Court reemphasized that it must

77
Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 1491 (arguing that the Court’s alternative-remedies analysis is
based in separation of powers principles).
78
Fallon, supra note 3, at 951.
79
Id. at 951–52.
80
Id. (quoting Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
81
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1851–52 (2017).
82
Fallon, supra note 3, at 952.
83
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1851.
84
Fallon, supra note 3, at 952; Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1853–54.
85
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1853.
86
Id.
87
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
88
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.
89
Id. at 1857–58.
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employ “‘caution’ before ‘extending Bivens remedies into any new context.’”90
In a relatively circular definition, the Court stated the test for a new context is
whether “the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases
decided by [the Supreme Court.]”91 The Court gave examples of such
meaningful differences,92 but ultimately it seems that the Court will find any
context new unless the case presents with exactly the same facts and issues as
either Bivens, Davis, or Carlson.93 In Abbasi, the Court narrowly framed the
respondents’ claims regarding the detention policy, which bolstered the Court’s
conclusion that the context was new.94 While the Court’s “new context”
definition95 offers little hope that Bivens will ever be extended,96 Justice
Kennedy emphasized that the Court was not overruling Bivens nor had Congress
denounced Bivens.97
Partly relying on the deterrence rationale discussed in Correctional Services
Corp. v. Malesko,98 the Court in Abbasi maintained that Bivens claims are not
suited for challenging an entity’s policy.99 The Court further reasoned that
allowing a Bivens suit aimed at an entity’s policy, such as the detention policy
here,100 “would require courts to interfere in an intrusive way with sensitive
functions of the Executive Branch”101 by prying into the considerations and
arguments that led to the formulation of such a policy.102 Focusing on the
separation of powers,103 the Court also noted that the Constitution grants national
90

Id. at 1857 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001)).
Id. at 1859.
92
Id. at 1859–60 (including “the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the
generality or specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond
to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was
operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence
of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.”)
93
Daniel Blair, One Step Away: How Hernandez II Signals the Elimination of Bivens, 64 ST. LOUIS UNIV.
L.J. 711, 717–19 (2020).
94
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860. Specifically, the Court framed the detention policy claims as ones which
“challenge the confinement conditions imposed on illegal aliens pursuant to a high-level executive policy created
in the wake of a major terrorist attack on American soil.” Id.
95
Id. at 1859.
96
Blair, supra note 93, at 717–19.
97
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856. Justice Kennedy stated that “this opinion is not intended to cast doubt on
the continued force, or even the necessity, of Bivens in the search-and-seizure context in which it arose.” Id.
98
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001).
99
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1861.
102
Id.
103
Id. But see Fallon, supra note 3, at 953–54 (arguing the Court was less concerned with separation of
powers implications when it upheld a qualified immunity defense in Ziglar v. Abbasi for a § 1985 claim even
though that statute does not specifically make such a defense available).
91
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security powers to the Legislative and Executive Branches.104 For the Court,
these special factors, namely separation of powers principles and national
security concerns, ruled the day.105 The Court also stated that these special
factors “suggest that Congress’ failure to provide a damages remedy might be
more than mere oversight, and that congressional silence might be more than
‘inadvertent.’”106
Finally, the Court emphasized that it was of “central importance”107 to its
denial of a cause of action that the respondents potentially had alternative
remedies available to them—namely, injunctive relief and a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.108 Interestingly, the Court acknowledged that habeas has not
yet been held to apply in cases challenging a detainee’s condition of
confinement.109 Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that these remedies would
have “provided a faster and more direct route to relief[.]”110 After Abbasi, the
alternative remedy need not be as effective as Bivens,111 nor does it need to be
certain to exist—“the mere possibility of another remedy may suffice[.]”112
2. Hernandez v. Mesa (2020)
In Hernandez v. Mesa, the Supreme Court considered whether to extend
Bivens to provide a remedy against a federal border patrol agent who shot across
the Texas border and killed a fifteen-year-old Mexican boy on Mexican soil.113
The boy’s parents sought damages against the border patrol agent for violations
of the boy’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.114 Finding that a cross-border
shooting claim was a “markedly new”115 context, the Court quickly moved on
to the special-factors analysis.116 Ultimately, the Court declined to provide a
Bivens remedy because there were special “factors that counsel[ed]
hesitation,”117 especially potential foreign relations effects,118 national security
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. II, §§ 1–2).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1862.
Id.; see Litman, supra note 5, at 1509–10.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862.
Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988)).
Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 4, at 1486 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386 (1983)).
Litman, supra note 5, at 1509–10.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
Id. at 741.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 744–49.
Id. at 744.
Id.; Blair, supra note 93, at 720–21.
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concerns,119 and various statutes in which Congress prohibited damages claims
against federal officials when the injury occurred abroad.120 The Court made
clear that all of these special factors stemmed from one common concern—
“respect for the separation of powers.”121
As for the effect on foreign relations, the Court highlighted the adverse
interests of the United States and Mexico in how a situation such as this one was
handled and determined that it was “not [the Court’s] task to arbitrate between
them.”122 The Court also emphasized that the Executive Branch “has ‘the lead
role in foreign policy.’”123 In the realm of national security, the Court articulated
the importance of border security and compared judicial restraint in this realm
to the restraint the Court showed regarding military discipline in Chappell v.
Wallace.124 The Court stated, “Since regulating the conduct of agents at the
border unquestionably has national security implications, the risk of
undermining border security provides reason to hesitate before extending Bivens
into this field.”125
The Court determined that “it is ‘telling,’ . . . that Congress has repeatedly
declined to authorize the award of damages for injury inflicted outside [U.S.]
borders.”126 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in the dissent, the Court’s analysis
overly focused on the fact that the boy happened to be on the Mexican side of
the border when he was shot.127 In the words of Justice Ginsburg, “[the boy’s]
location at the precise moment the bullet landed should not matter one whit”128
because “[t]he purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer.”129 Similarly, the Court

119

Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 746; Blair, supra note 93, at 720–21.
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 747; Blair, supra note 93, at 720–21.
121
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 749 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1859 (2017)).
122
Id. at 745. The Court indicated that the U.S. Executive had determined that the agent had not acted
unreasonably in the circumstances based on Border Patrol policy and thus should not “face charges in the United
States nor be extradited to stand trial in Mexico.” Id. at 744. On the other hand, Mexico argued that the agent
should be extradited to stand trial in Mexico under Mexican law and that “the United States has an obligation
under international law, specifically Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, . . .
to provide a remedy for the shooting in this case.” Id. at 745.
123
Id. at 744 (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008)).
124
Id. at 746–47; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
125
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 747.
126
Id. The Court gave examples of statutes that decline to offer damages awards for injuries inflicted
outside the United States, including 28 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the Torture Victim
Protection Act. Id. at 747–48.
127
Id. at 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
128
Id. Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that “[i]t scarcely makes sense for a remedy trained on
deterring rogue officer conduct to turn upon a happenstance subsequent to the conduct—a bullet landing in one
half of a culvert, not the other.” Id.
129
Id. (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017).
120
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refused to give equal weight to the fact that the agent’s conduct occurred on the
United States side of the border.130 Nevertheless, the Court deferred to
Congress’s refusal in related statutes to allow damages claims against federal
officials when the injury occurred abroad.131
The Court also stated that “[i]t is irrelevant to a ‘special factors’ analysis
whether the laws currently on the books afford [the plaintiff] an ‘adequate’
federal remedy for his injuries[.]”132 On the other hand, the dissent pointed out
that the availability of alternative remedies was fundamentally important to the
Court’s holding in Abbasi.133 Here, the plaintiffs had no alternative remedies
under both American law and Mexican law.134 Importantly, the dissent
suggested that “[w]hile the absence of alternative remedies, standing alone, does
not warrant a Bivens action, . . . it remains a significant consideration under
Abbasi’s guidelines.”135 Regardless, the Court held that separation of powers
principles defeated the plaintiff’s Bivens claim.136
3. Current Bivens Test
Currently, the test for determining whether a court should extend a Bivens
claim to an individual consists of two steps. First, a court considers “[w]hether
the claim arises in a new Bivens context, i.e., whether ‘the case is different in a
meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by [the Supreme
Court].’”137 Second, if the answer to the first question is yes, then a court will
consider “whether there are any special factors that counsel hesitation about
granting the extension.”138 If such factors exist, “that is, if [the Court] has reason
to pause before applying Bivens in a new context or to a new class of
defendants—[the Court] reject[s] the request.”139

130

Id. at 756.
Id. at 749.
132
Id. at 750 (quoting United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987)).
133
Id. at 757 (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862).
134
Id. The dissent indicated that “[i]t is uncontested that plaintiffs find no alternative relief in Mexican
law, state law, the Federal Tort Claims Act (‘FTCA’), the Alien Tort Statute (‘ATS’), or federal criminal law.”
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 750. The Court noted that “[w]hen evaluating whether to extend Bivens [sic], the most important
question ‘is “who should decide” whether to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts?’” Id.
(quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857). Further, the Court stated, “The correct ‘answer most often will be
Congress.’” Id.
137
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1864.
138
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 743.
139
Id.
131
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4. Special Factors
The special-factors analysis articulated by the Court is incredibly broad.140
In fact, “[u]nder the current Bivens jurisprudence, there is possibly, even likely,
no limit to special factors that counsel hesitation, short of [a rational basis].”141
This section provides a non-exhaustive list of special factors the Court has found
in previous Bivens cases.
In the military realm, the Court has found that the unique relationship
between military personnel and their superior officers,142 military’s separate
disciplinary system,143 and Constitution’s express grant of military powers to
Congress144 are all “special factors counselling hesitation[.]”145 As for federal
agency liability under Bivens, the Court has found the “potentially enormous
financial burden”146 on federal agencies stemming from such liability to be a
special factor.147
The Court has also emphasized that the separation of powers is “central to
[this] analysis.”148 Therefore, the Court must “concentrate on whether the
Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider
and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.”149
The Court has recognized that Congress’s establishment of any “alternative
remedial structure”150 can single-handedly preclude the Court from extending a
Bivens cause of action,151 whether or not that remedial structure offers the
plaintiff adequate relief.152 In Abbasi, the Court demoted the analysis of
alternative remedies to a consideration of the special-factors analysis.153 As
James Pfander and Wade Formo point out, this “represented a departure from

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Blair, supra note 93, at 720.
Id. at 720.
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299 (1983).
Id. at 304.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 298.
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994).
Id.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017).
Id. at 1857–58.
Id. at 1858.
Id.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 750 (2020) (quoting United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683

(1987)).
153
James E. Pfander & Wade Formo, The Past and Future of Equitable Remedies: An Essay for Frank
Johnson, 71 ALA. L. REV. 723, 746 (2020) (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858).
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the approach in Wilkie v. Robbins, where the Court devoted the first step of its
analysis to an assessment of alternatives.”154
Further examples of special factors include potential foreign relations
effects155 and national security concerns.156 Ultimately, it seems the Court will
be able to find a special factor counselling hesitation if it wants to in any given
situation.157
D. The Future of Bivens
As highlighted in the Abbasi and Hernandez decisions, the Supreme Court’s
approach to Bivens claims has been increasingly restrictive.158 With practically
any difference being sufficient to render a case a “new context”159 and the broad
scope of the special-factors analysis,160 it seems unlikely that the Court will
extend Bivens past the three contexts to which it has already been extended.161
Furthermore, two current justices of the Supreme Court—Justice Thomas and
Justice Gorsuch—have argued for the Court to overrule Bivens altogether.162
The “conservative majority[’s]”163 resistance to Bivens stems from the
separation of powers, and specifically, the lack of power the Judiciary has to
legislate under the Constitution.164 In Hernandez, Justice Thomas argued in his
concurrence that allowing the Bivens doctrine to endure would “perpetuat[e] a
usurpation of the legislative power”165 because Congress, the body with the
legislative power,166 has not acted to create such a damages cause of action
against federal officials.167 According to the “conservative majority,”168 creating
a cause of action for constitutional violations is a “quintessentially legislative

154

Id. at 745 (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 744; Blair, supra note 93, at 720–21.
156
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 746; Blair, supra note 93, at 720–21.
157
Blair, supra note 93, at 720.
158
Id. at 714.
159
Id. at 718–19.
160
Id. at 722.
161
Id. at 711, 722.
162
Id. (citing Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 750–53 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
163
Id. at 722 (citing Taylor K. Brown, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Who Are the Justices on the US Supreme
Court?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33103973). The conservative justices on the
Court currently include Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas. See id. at
722, 723 n.102.
164
Id. at 711, 716.
165
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring); Blair, supra note 93, at 715.
166
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
167
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring); Blair, supra note 93, at 715–16.
168
Blair, supra note 93, at 722.
155
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act.”169 Thus, the Court has deferred to Congress and refused to extend Bivens
so as not to impinge on the legislative responsibilities of Congress.170
With Justice Ginsburg’s passing in September 2020,171 President Trump
nominated to the Supreme Court now-Justice Amy Barrett of the Seventh
Circuit, a “favourite of social conservatives[.]”172 Justice Barrett was confirmed
on October 26, 2020.173 The Supreme Court now sits at six conservative justices
and three liberal justices.174 Given that the pushback against the Bivens doctrine
stems from the conservative justices on the Court,175 the confirmation of Justice
Barrett is concerning for fans of the Bivens doctrine. With Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch calling for the end of Bivens,176 it remains to be seen how the changing
ideological makeup of the Court will affect the future of the Bivens doctrine.
II. CANADA
A. The Canadian Government and Constitution
As a constitutional monarchy and federal parliamentary democracy,177
Canada has a federal government in addition to provincial governments for its
ten provinces and three territories.178 The Constitution of Canada is made up of
the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Constitution Act, 1982, which contains the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter).179 To protect human rights
in Canada, the Parliament enacted the Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960 and the

169

Id. at 716.
Id.
171
Nina Totenberg, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Champion of Gender Equality, Dies at 87, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Sept. 18, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/18/100306972/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-champion-ofgender-equality-dies-at-87.
172
Anthony Zurcher, Amy Coney Barrett: Trump Nominates Conservative Favourite for Supreme Court,
BBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54312699.
173
Grace Segers, Amy Coney Barrett Sworn In as Newest Supreme Court Justice, CBS NEWS (Oct. 27,
2020, 11:18 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-justice-sworn-in.
174
Zurcher, supra note 172; The Political Leanings of the Supreme Court Justices, AXIOS (June 1, 2019),
https://www.axios.com/supreme-court-justices-ideology-52ed3cad-fcff-4467-a336-8bec2e6e36d4.html (stating
that Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor are the liberal justices on the Court).
175
Blair, supra note 93, at 715–16.
176
Id. at 711, 722 (citing Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 750–53 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
177
Ted Tjaden & Kim Nayyer, Update: Researching Canadian Law, GLOBALEX (Feb. 2019), https://
www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Canada1.html#_The_Canadian_Legal.
178
Id.; Introduction to the Canadian Legal System, UNIV. MELBOURNE, https://unimelb.libguides.com/
c.php?g=402997&p=5235595 (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
179
The Canadian Constitution, UNIV. MELBOURNE, https://unimelb.libguides.com/c.php?g=402997&p
=5235583 (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
170
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Canadian Human Rights Act in 1977.180 However, because legislation is easily
susceptible to change, the protection that these laws provide is relatively
minimal.181 As part of the written Constitution, the Charter protects human rights
in Canada to a greater extent than the aforementioned laws.182 Furthermore, the
Charter “applies to all government action, meaning to the provincial legislatures
and Parliament, and to everything done under their authority.”183
Unlike in the United States, the power of Canadian courts to remedy a
Charter violation is “constitutionally guaranteed.”184 The Constitution of Canada
provides constitutional remedies in three separate provisions: Section 24(1) of
the Charter, Section 24(2) of the Charter, and Section 52(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982.185 Section 24(1) of the Charter provides:
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction
to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances.186

Notably, the Charter grants courts wide discretion in fashioning a remedy to
redress constitutional violations under Section 24(1).187 Marilyn Pilkington, a
prominent scholar of Canadian Constitutional Law, described this wide
discretion as follows:
The Charter provides no explicit guidance as to the purposes for
which remedies are to be given, the principles according to which
courts should determine whether a remedy is appropriate and just in

180
Rights and Freedoms in Canada, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cp-pm/just/06.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Marilyn L. Pilkington, Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, 62 CAN. BAR REV. 517, 530 (1984); accord Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 24(1), Part
I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). In the United States, the
power to remedy a constitutional violation either stems from a statute, as is the case with state officials under 28
U.S.C. § 1983, or stems from the Court’s “ordinary jurisdiction and remedial authority” to imply a cause of
action under the Bivens doctrine. Pilkington, supra, at 530, 533.
185
Katharine June Fisher, Using Charter Damages to Provide Meaningful Redress and Promote State
Accountability: A Re-Examination of the Omar Khadr Case 13–14 (Aug. 11, 2020) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis,
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University) (on file with Osgoode Digital Commons).
186
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 24(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
187
Fisher, supra note 185, at 14.
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the circumstances, or the procedures through which applications for
remedies should be made.188

Thus, the Charter expressly grants Canadian courts the power to determine how
to best remedy a Charter violation under Section 24(1),189 which could be
through a declaration, supervisory jurisdiction, injunction, Charter damages, or
other remedies.190 Furthermore, it seems that the only textual limitation on this
discretion is that the remedy must be “appropriate and just in the
circumstances.”191 Charter damages under Section 24(1) of the Charter will be
the focus of this Comment. However, it is helpful to understand the entire
remedial framework provided in the Constitution of Canada.
While Section 24(1) is incredibly broad, Section 24(2) of the Charter is
limited in application to criminal proceedings.192 Section 24(2) provides courts
with the power to exclude any unconstitutionally obtained evidence upon a
showing that “the admission of [it in the proceedings] ‘would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.’”193 Finally, Section 52(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 declares the Constitution as “the supreme law of
Canada[.]”194 Thus, Section 52(1) renders all legislation that conflicts with the
Constitution null and void.195
Since the Charter explicitly states that it applies to the federal and provincial
governments,196 individuals seeking redress for Charter violations are able to
directly sue the government, rather than be forced to sue individual officials, as

188

Pilkington, supra note 184, at 518.
Id. at 530; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 24(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
190
Fisher, supra note 185, at 14.
191
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 24(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.); see Pilkington, supra note 184, at 530; Raj Anand, Damages for
Unconstitutional Actions: A Rule in Search of a Rationale, 27 Nat’l J. Const. L. 159, 160 (2010).
192
Fisher, supra note 185, at 14.
193
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 24(2), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.); accord Fisher, supra note 185, at 14.
194
Constitution Act, 1982, § 52(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
195
Id.; see Fisher, supra note 185, at 14. According to Fisher, “[r]emedial options used by courts under
subsection 52(1) include striking down a law, severing offending language from the statute, reading down a
provision that is overbroad, reading in language to remedy an under-inclusive provision, ordering a temporary
suspension of invalidity, and providing an exemption for a particular claimant[.]” Id. at 14–15.
196
Pilkington, supra note 184, at 535; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 32(1), Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). Specifically, Section 32(1) of
the Charter applies “to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority
of Parliament . . . [and] to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the
authority of the legislature of each province.” Id.; Pilkington, supra note 184, at 552.
189
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is the case in the United States due to sovereign immunity.197 For this reason,
Pilkington argues Canadian courts have “greater remedial scope” than U.S.
courts.198
B. Charter Damages Jurisprudence
1. Pre-Ward Cases
Canadian courts have recognized the existence of damages for violations of
the Charter for around thirty years.199 However, the doctrine surrounding Charter
damages has evolved sluggishly.200 Prior to 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada
(SCC) refrained from directly addressing the purpose of Charter damages and
the framework that courts should follow in determining the applicability of
Charter damages in a given situation.201 Throughout this period, Charter
damages were discussed as a potential remedy in the SCC’s dicta and by
dissenting judges, but “usually only in reference to how this area of the law was
uncertain at best.”202 The following SCC cases evidence the need for guidance
with respect to the Charter-damages remedy.203
In RJR — MacDonald Inc. v. Canada, the SCC considered the harm that
would occur to two tobacco companies in the absence of a preliminary injunction
restricting the application of a challenged advertising statute.204 Although this
case involves the issuance of an injunction under the Charter,205 the Court
incidentally discussed the availability of Charter damages.206 While the Court

197
Pilkington, supra note 184, at 535. Pilkington also points out that these individuals will not “be denied
the fruits of their victory against an official since it is open to a court to find government vicariously liable
whenever it is appropriate and just to do so.” Id.
198
Id.
199
Chuks Okpaluba, The Development of Charter Damages Jurisprudence in Canada: Guidelines from
the Supreme Court, 23 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 55, 55 (2012).
200
Id.
201
Fisher, supra note 185, at 21. Fisher argues that the “absence of a clear standard to assess whether
Charter damages were appropriate . . . created inconsistency in the jurisprudence with respect to fault
requirements, double recovery, the overall purpose of the remedy, and what objectives it ought to promote.” Id.
202
Peter Krikor Adourian, Charter Damages: Private Law in the Unique Public Law Remedy 16 (Sept. 7,
2018) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University) (on file with Osgoode Digital
Commons). Adourian further notes that the SCC’s “decisions around Charter damages are something akin to
setting up the furniture before the house is built, addressing details like specific immunities to Charter damages
before defining its purpose and function.” Id.
203
See Fisher, supra note 185, at 22.
204
RJR — MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 SCC 117, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, paras.
341–42 (Can.); see Adourian, supra note 202, at 17.
205
RJR — MacDonald Inc., 1 S.C.R. at 311; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 17.
206
RJR — MacDonald Inc., 1 S.C.R. at 311; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 17.

PRINCE_7.11.22

370

7/11/2022 10:47 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

acknowledged the availability of Charter damages as a potential remedy under
the Charter,207 the Court noted that they are not “the primary remedy[.]”208 The
Court further observed that an analytical framework for Charter damages has yet
to be created.209 Nevertheless, the Court offered no guidance on the subject.210
Although R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc. does not directly involve Charter
damages, it does involve a Charter remedy under Section 24(1).211 Specifically,
the SCC held that it was within the jurisdiction of a provincial court judge to
award a claimant costs under Section 24(1) against the Crown for a violation of
the Charter.212 Importantly for the development of the Charter-damages remedy,
the Court stated the following: “To the extent that it is difficult or impossible to
obtain remedies for Charter breaches, the Charter ceases to be an effective
instrument for maintaining the rights of Canadians.”213 This statement
demonstrates the SCC’s recognition of the importance of effective and available
remedies with respect to Charter violations.
In Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance),214 the SCC considered
whether Charter damages were available in addition to a remedy striking down
unconstitutional legislation under Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.215
In accordance with precedent, the Court applied the “general rule against
awarding concurrent remedies”216 and determined that Charter damages were
not simultaneously available with a remedy under Section 52(1).217 In what
would later be coined as the Mackin principle, the Court announced an exception
to this general rule against concurrent remedies.218 Specifically, the Court held
that Charter damages were not available for a state’s enforcement of a valid, yet
subsequently invalidated, statute “absent conduct that is clearly wrong, in bad

207

RJR — MacDonald Inc., 1 S.C.R. at para. 341; see Fisher, supra note 185, at 22.
RJR — MacDonald Inc., 1 S.C.R. at para. 341; see Fisher, supra note 185, at 22.
209
RJR — MacDonald Inc., 1 S.C.R. at para. 342; see Fisher, supra note 185, at 22.
210
RJR — MacDonald Inc., 1 S.C.R. at para. 341; see Fisher, supra note 185, at 22. As Peter Adourian
points out, “[i]n over a decade of Supreme Court decisions on the Charter, these three comments – which are
entirely dicta in a case about injunctions, not damages – became the most informative precedential literature on
Charter damages.” Adourian, supra note 202, at 17.
211
R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., 2001 SCC 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575 (Can.); see Fisher, supra note 185, at 23.
212
974649 Ontario Inc., 3 S.C.R. at para. 97; see Fisher, supra note 185, at 23.
213
974649 Ontario Inc., 3 S.C.R. at para. 1; see Fisher, supra note 185, at 23.
214
Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13, [2002] 1
S.C.R. 405 (Can.).
215
Id.; see Fisher, supra note 185, at 23.
216
Fisher, supra note 185, at 23; see Schachter v. Canada, 1992 SCC 74, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (Can.);
Guimond v. Quebec (Attorney General), 1996 SCC 175, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347 (Can.).
217
Mackin, 1 S.C.R. at para. 33; see Fisher, supra note 185, at 23.
218
Id.
208
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faith or an abuse of power[.]”219 While the Court determined that the legislation
was unconstitutional, it reasoned that holding the state liable in damages for
enforcing a law that was valid at the time of enforcement would discourage
officials from enforcing a law for fear of it being subsequently struck down.220
The Court sought to “balance . . . the protection of constitutional rights and the
need for effective government.”221 This concern for “good governance”222
reappears in the current Charter-damages framework.223 Instead of providing an
answer to the fault requirement question, Mackin contributed to the
jurisprudential “confusion about whether the state had to commit some type of
fault before Charter damages could be awarded.”224
In Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), the SCC
considered whether a trial judge’s retention of supervisory jurisdiction over the
government’s compliance with a court order was an “appropriate and just”
remedy under Section 24(1) of the Charter.225 The trial court found that the
claimants’ Section 23 Charter rights were violated by the province “when it
failed to provide adequate French-language schooling.”226 The trial judge
ordered the province to “use their best efforts to construct schools and provide
homogenous French programs by certain dates.”227 In fashioning his remedy, the
trial judge also “retained supervisory jurisdiction” to ensure that the province
was adhering to the order and its schedule.228 On appeal, the SCC upheld the
trial judge’s remedy five to four.229 However, the dissent asserted that the
separation of powers doctrine prevented this type of supervisory jurisdiction.230
More importantly for this Comment’s purposes, the Court illuminated the
meaning of an “appropriate and just” remedy under Section 24(1) by providing
four factors for courts to utilize in making that determination.231 According to
the Court, an “appropriate and just” remedy will (1) “meaningfully vindicate[]
the rights and freedoms of the claimants[;]”232 (2) “employ means that are
219

Id. at para. 78; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 24.
Mackin, 1 S.C.R. at para. 79; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 27.
221
Mackin, 1 S.C.R. at para. 79; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 26–27.
222
Adourian, supra note 202, at 27.
223
Fisher, supra note 185, at 24.
224
Id.
225
Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, para. 55
(Can.); see Fisher, supra note 185, at 24.
226
Adourian, supra note 202, at 18; see Doucet-Boudreau, 3 S.C.R. at paras. 1–8.
227
Fisher, supra note 185, at 25; see Doucet-Boudreau, 3 S.C.R. at paras. 5–8.
228
Fisher, supra note 185, at 25; see Doucet-Boudreau, 3 S.C.R. at paras. 5–8.
229
Doucet-Boudreau, 3 S.C.R. at para. 55.
230
Id. at para. 92 (LeBel and Deschamps, JJ., dissenting); see Fisher, supra note 185, at 25.
231
Doucet-Boudreau, 3 S.C.R. at para. 55; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 18.
232
Doucet-Boudreau, 3 S.C.R. at paras. 55–58; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 18.
220
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legitimate within the framework of [Canada’s] constitutional democracy[;]”233
(3) align with the proper “function and powers of a court[;]”234 and (4) be “fair
to the party against whom the order is made.”235 Thus, the Court defined Section
24(1) remedies in a way that would give effect to the purpose of the Charter
provision.236 The Court reasoned that such a purposive interpretation of Section
24(1) was necessary in order to promote the well-known principle that “where
there is a right, there must be a remedy.”237
As can be seen from the sparse jurisprudence on Charter damages since the
Charter’s enactment in 1982,238 Canadian courts needed the SCC to provide
them with “a coherent framework” for addressing Charter-damages claims.239
2. Vancouver (City) v. Ward
In Vancouver (City) v. Ward, the SCC finally announced a structured
framework for analyzing a claim for Charter damages.240 At a ceremony in
Vancouver, police mistook Alan Ward, a civil rights lawyer, for someone who
intended to fling a pie at the Prime Minister.241 The police chased and
handcuffed Ward and arrested him for breach of the peace.242 The police then
took him to a police station where he was subsequently strip-searched, and
impounded his car.243 Later, the police discovered they could not obtain a search
warrant for the car and lacked the necessary evidence to charge Ward.244 Around
four and half hours after his arrest, Ward was released.245 Ward sued the
Province and the City of Vancouver for various torts and for breach of his
Charter rights, seeking Charter damages.246

233

Doucet-Boudreau, 3 S.C.R. at para. 56; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 18.
Doucet-Boudreau, 3 S.C.R. at para. 57; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 18.
235
Doucet-Boudreau, 3 S.C.R. at para. 58; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 18.
236
Adourian, supra note 202, at 18.
237
Doucet-Boudreau, 3 S.C.R. at para. 25; see Fisher, supra note 185, at 25.
238
See Fisher, supra note 185, at 17.
239
Id. at 22.
240
See Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28, para. 22 (Can.).
241
Okpaluba, supra note 199, at 63; Ward, 2 S.C.R. at para. 22. Apparently the Prime Minster was a
popular target for being “pied.” Brooke MacKenzie, Backpedalling on Charter Damages: Henry v. British
Columbia (Attorney General), 45 ADVOCS.’ Q. 359, 361 (2016).
242
Okpaluba, supra note 199, at 63; Ward, 2 S.C.R. at paras. 7–8.
243
Okpaluba, supra note 199, at 63; Ward, 2 S.C.R. at para. 2.
244
Okpaluba, supra note 199, at 63; Ward, 2 S.C.R. at para. 9.
245
Okpaluba, supra note 199, at 63; Ward, 2 S.C.R. at para. 9.
246
Okpaluba, supra note 199, at 63; Ward, 2 S.C.R. at para. 10.
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The SCC emphasized that Charter damages are a form of “public law
damages[.]”247 When an individual seeks Charter damages, he seeks damages
directly against the government, as opposed to the individual officers
responsible for the violation.248 If someone wished to sue the individual officer
responsible for violating his Charter rights, he would need to sue them through
“existing causes of action[,]”249 such as ordinary tort law.250
In a unanimous opinion, the SCC crafted a four-step process for courts to
determine when damages are available under Section 24(1) of the Charter. At
step one, the claimant must show that he has suffered a violation of his Charter
rights.251 At step two, the claimant must show that Charter damages fulfill at
least one of the following functions: compensation, vindication, or deterrence.252
At step three, the burden is on the defendant (i.e. the state) to show that Charter
damages are “inappropriate and unjust” because of countervailing factors.253
Finally, at step four the court determines the quantum of damages.254
In step one, the Court determined that Ward’s Section 8 Charter rights had
been violated by both the strip search and the seizure of his car.255 At step two,
the Court emphasized that it was adopting a “functional approach to
damages[.]”256 The goal of compensation is to place the claimant in the position
he would have been in but-for the breach of his Charter rights.257 The Court
emphasized that compensation would generally be “the most prominent
function”258 and that a court should account for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss.259 As for vindication, the focus is on “affirming constitutional

247

Ward, 2 S.C.R. at para. 22.
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id. However, the Court noted that “the underlying policy considerations that are engaged when
awarding private law damages against state actors may be relevant when awarding public law damages directly
against the state.” Id.
251
Id. at para. 4.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id. at paras. 62, 75. Section 8 of the Charter states, “Everyone has the right to be secure against
unreasonable search or seizure.” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 8, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
256
Ward, 2 S.C.R. at para. 24.
257
Id. at paras. 25, 27; Kent Roach, A Promising Late Spring for Charter Damages: Ward v. Vancouver,
29 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 145, 154–55 (2010).
258
Ward, 2 S.C.R. at para. 25.
259
Id. at paras. 49–50.
248
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values”260 and addressing the societal harm caused by the breach.261 Finally,
deterring future breaches of the Charter is an important goal of awarding Charter
damages.262 By deterrence, the Court emphasized that it was referring to
“general deterrence,”263 meaning that the goal is to dissuade other officials from
violating the Charter and to foster an overall environment of governmental
compliance.264 Importantly, the Court stated that the absence of “personal loss
does not preclude damages where the objectives of vindication or deterrence
clearly call for an award.”265
As for the strip search, the Court determined that the Charter violation was
“serious”266 because strip searches are necessarily demeaning.267 Thus,
compensation was required for these intangible interests.268 The objectives of
deterrence and vindication would also be served by an award of damages for the
strip search, due to the nature of the officer’s conduct.269 On the other hand, the
seizure of the car did not call for an award of Charter damages because the police
never searched the car and instead drove Ward to his car following his release.270
Since Ward did not require compensation for the seizure of his car and the
Charter violation was “not of a serious nature[,]”271 the Court found that a
declaration of unconstitutionality would “adequately” fulfill the goals of
vindication and deterrence.272
At step three, the state must show that countervailing factors render damages
an inappropriate remedy in order to negate an award of Charter damages.273 The
Court did not provide an exhaustive list of such countervailing factors,274 but
indicated that the availability of alternative remedies and good governance

260

Id. at para. 28.
Id.
262
Id. at para. 29.
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id. at para. 30.
266
Id. at para. 64.
267
Id. at para 64–65 (indicating further that “it is not too much to expect that police would be familiar with
the settled law that routine strip searches are inappropriate where the individual is being held for a short time in
police cells, is not mingling with the general prison population, and where the police have no legitimate concerns
that the individual is concealing weapons that could be used to harm themselves or others[.]”).
268
Id. at para. 64.
269
Id. at para. 66.
270
Id. at para. 77.
271
Id.
272
Id. at para. 78.
273
Id. at para. 33.
274
Id. at para. 34.
261
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concerns were two considerations.275 If an alternative remedy adequately fulfills
the goals of compensation, vindication, and/or deterrence, then Charter damages
“would serve no function” and therefore would not be available.276 While a
possible tort claim does not bar Charter damages, the court noted that “double
compensation”277 is not appropriate.278 As for good governance concerns, the
Court rejected the idea that Charter damages would always “chill[]” government
conduct in a negative way because accepting that argument would mean that
Charter damages would never be awarded.279 Furthermore, deterring breaches
of the Charter reinforces effective governance.280 The Court noted that a valid
good governance concern was present in Mackin, namely that holding a state
liable in damages for enforcing a law that was valid at the time of enforcement
would discourage officials from enforcing the law.281
As for the strip search, the Court noted that there were no available
alternative remedies that would fulfill the function of compensation and redress
his Section 8 Charter rights.282 The Court also determined that no good
governance concerns applied.283 Thus, the Court found that Charter damages
were functionally required.284 Since the Court found the seizure of Ward’s car
was adequately remedied through a declaration, the Court did not address step
three or four in relation to that claim.285
In step four, the Court addressed the amount of damages to be awarded for
the strip search.286 The phrase “appropriate and just” applies not only to whether
damages should be awarded at all, but also to the proper amount of damages
awarded.287 Compensation requires “evidence of the loss suffered” for both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary injuries.288 As for vindication and deterrence, the
275

Id. at paras. 33–34, 38.
Id. at para. 34.
277
Id. at para. 36.
278
Id. Therefore, “a concurrent action in tort, or other private law claim, bars s. 24(1) damages if the result
would be double compensation[.]” Id.
279
Id. at para. 38.
280
Id.
281
Id. at para. 39; Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick, 2002 SCC
13, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, para. 79 (Can.); see Adourian, supra note 202, at 27.
282
Ward, 2 S.C.R. at para. 68. The Court noted that Ward’s tort claims of assault and negligence were
dismissed, and that “[w]hile this defeated [his] claim in tort, it did not change the fact that his right under s. 8 of
the Charter . . . was violated.” Id.
283
Id.
284
Id. at para. 69.
285
Id. at para. 77.
286
Id. at paras. 70–73.
287
Id. at para. 46.
288
Id. at paras. 48–50.
276
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Court indicated that a court should consider the “seriousness of the breach,”289
the “impact of the breach on the claimant[,]”290 and the “seriousness of the state
misconduct[.]”291 The amount of damages needs to be fair to the claimant and
the state.292 Importantly, the Court emphasized that a court should “focus on the
breach of Charter rights as an independent wrong, worthy of compensation in
its own right.”293 An award of $5000 was sufficient to fulfill the goals of Charter
damages because the strip search was “relatively brief and not extremely
disrespectful”294 as Ward was not forced to remove his underwear.295
3. Post-Ward Cases
Since Ward, three notable Charter-damages cases have come before the
SCC: Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General) in 2015, Ernst v. Alberta
Energy Regulator in 2017, and Conseil scolaire francophone de la ColombieBritannique v. British Columbia in 2020.296 One would think the SCC would
remain loyal to the Ward framework that it took so long to develop, but a close
examination of these next three cases suggests the Court is not so faithful.297
a. Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General)
In Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), a man who was wrongfully
convicted in 1983 and spent twenty-seven years in prison sought Charter
damages for violations of his Section 7 and Section 11(d) rights.298 The man’s
wrongful conviction and imprisonment stemmed from the Crown prosecutor’s
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the man before, during, and after his
289

Id. at para. 52.
Id.
291
Id. The Court stated, “Generally speaking, the more egregious the conduct and the more serious the
repercussions on the claimant, the higher the award for vindication or deterrence will be.” Id.
292
Id. at para. 53.
293
Id. at para. 55. The Court highlighted that while this is true, “damages under s. 24(1) should not
duplicate damages awarded under private law causes of action, such as tort, where compensation of personal
loss is at issue.” Id.
294
Id. at paras. 71, 73.
295
Id. at para. 71.
296
See Fisher, supra note 185, at 35.
297
Id.
298
Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 24, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 214 (Can.); see
Adourian, supra note 202, at 49. Section 7 of the Charter provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). The right provided in Section 11(d) of the Charter is the right
“to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal[.]” Id. § 11(d).
290
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trial.299 The man was acquitted upon the discovery of this information.300 The
SCC considered whether a claimant must plead the Crown prosecutor acted with
malice in not disclosing the information in order to be eligible for Charter
damages.301 While the SCC determined that malice is not required, the majority
announced that the claimant must plead the Crown “intentionally [withheld]
information when it [knew], or would reasonably [have been] expected to know,
that the information [was] material to the [accused’s] defence” and that
nondisclosure of the information would “likely impinge on the accused’s ability
to make full answer and defence.”302 The majority reasoned that requiring this
“high threshold”303 would promote good governance by ensuring that Crown
prosecutors are able to perform their jobs without being “motivated by fear of
civil liability[.]”304
The concurring opinion of Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Karakatsanis
disagreed with the way the majority approached the countervailing factors in this
case.305 Specifically, the concurrence highlighted that under the Ward
framework countervailing factors are to be raised by the government during the
third step of the analysis and thereby have no impact on the Court’s assessment
of a Charter damages claim until that step.306 The majority, however, utilized
theoretical policy concerns about protecting prosecutors to introduce a threshold
liability requirement into the claimant’s obligations at step one.307 In this way,
the majority failed to follow the Ward framework despite noting the framework
was controlling.308 While the SCC’s holding technically only applies to cases
involving wrongful non-disclosure,309 it is possible this case will encourage
lower courts and the SCC itself to supply threshold liability requirements in
other types of cases as a result of considering policy concerns prior to the third

299

Henry, 2 S.C.R. at paras. 9, 12, 122; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 49.
Henry, 2 S.C.R. at para. 19; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 49.
301
Henry, 2 S.C.R. at para. 30; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 50.
302
Henry, 2 S.C.R. at para. 31; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 50.
303
Henry, 2 S.C.R. at para. 31. Peter Adourian summarizes the Court’s new test for Charter damages in
wrongful nondisclosure cases “as requiring a Charter infringement plus intentional action, reasonable
foreseeability, as well as causation and harm.” Adourian, supra note 202, at 50.
304
Henry, 2 S.C.R. at para. 40.
305
Id. at para. 108 (McLachlin, C.J. and Karakatsanis, J., concurring); see MacKenzie, supra note 241, at
368.
306
Henry, 2 S.C.R. at para. 108 (McLachlin, C.J. and Karakatsanis, J., concurring); see MacKenzie, supra
note 241, at 368.
307
Henry, 2 S.C.R. at para. 40. As Brooke MacKenzie aptly stated, “The majority veered off track . . .
when it allowed policy concerns to steer it away from the Ward framework, rather than addressing those policy
considerations within the framework.” MacKenzie, supra note 241, at 371.
308
Henry, 2 S.C.R. at para. 34; see MacKenzie, supra note 241, at 365.
309
Henry, 2 S.C.R. at para. 33; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 54.
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step of the Ward framework.310 Thus, as Brooke MacKenzie points out, the
majority in Henry “once again introduced uncertainty into an area that was only
recently clarified.”311
b. Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator
In Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator,312 the SCC considered whether a
statutory immunity clause was unconstitutional because it barred individuals
from pursuing Charter-damages claims against a quasi-judicial regulatory
board.313 After publicly speaking out against the Alberta Energy Regulator
(Board), Ernst claimed that the Board violated her Charter right to freedom of
expression by barring her from communicating with the Board and from
registering her various complaints regarding hydraulic fracturing for over one
year.314 The Board argued that Ernst was unable to bring a Charter-damages
claim due to a statutory immunity clause that prevented individuals from
bringing suit against the Board for any action taken pursuant to the Energy
Resources Conservation Act.315 Ernst argued that this immunity clause was
unconstitutional because it barred her claim under the Charter for damages
against the Board.316
The SCC broadly held that damages could never be an “appropriate and just
remedy” for Charter violations committed by the Board.317 Interestingly, the
SCC emphasized that “[t]he jurisprudence does not require that every pleaded
claim for Charter damages be assessed on an individualized, case-by-case
basis[,]”318 even though Ward made clear that “[w]hat is appropriate and just
will depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”319
Nevertheless, the SCC claimed to apply the Ward framework, specifically the
countervailing factors portion, to determine that the Board could never be
subject to Charter damages.320 The SCC noted that judicial review is available
as an “alternative, and more effective, remedy” in these types of cases and that
310

See Adourian, supra note 202, at 54.
MacKenzie, supra note 241, at 360; see Adourian, supra note 202, at 51.
312
Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
313
Id. at para. 13.
314
Id. at para. 6.
315
Id. at para. 9; Energy Resources Conservation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c E-10, § 43 (repealed 2013) (Can.).
316
Ernst, 1 S.C.R. at para. 2.
317
Id. at para. 31. Justice Cromwell stated, “If Charter damages could never be an appropriate and just
remedy for Charter breaches by the Board, then [the immunity clause] does not limit the availability of such a
remedy under the Charter and the provision cannot be unconstitutional.” Id. at para. 24.
318
Id. at para. 29.
319
Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28, para. 19 (Can.) (emphasis added).
320
Ernst, 1 S.C.R. at para. 26.
311
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the Board’s ability to perform its functions would be frustrated if damages were
allowed.321 Furthermore, the SCC stated that a case-by-case analysis of whether
Charter damages are appropriate against regulatory boards would render an
immunity effectively useless.322 As in Henry, the SCC restricted the scope of the
Charter damages remedy, but this time by immunizing many regulatory boards
from Charter-damages claims.323
c. Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. British
Columbia
In Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. British
Columbia,324 the claimants alleged the Province violated their minoritylanguage rights under Section 23 of the Charter.325 The claimants sought
“various orders requiring the Province to alter its funding system for the
provision of French language education, remedy issues with inadequate
educational facilities . . . and provide compensation for past Section 23
breaches.”326 With regard to Charter damages, the SCC considered whether the
Mackin principle immunizes the government from Charter damages stemming
from “decisions made in accordance with government policies.”327 The SCC
held the Mackin principle does not apply to actions taken pursuant to
government policies because extending immunity to government policies would
render the Charter damages remedy “illusory.”328 The SCC stressed that such an
expansive interpretation of the Mackin principle would “permit a government to
avoid liability for damages simply by showing that its unlawful actions are
authorized by its policies.”329 Highlighting the differences between duly enacted

321
Id. at paras. 30, 41. Though acknowledging that Charter damages are not available as a remedy through
judicial review, the SCC emphasized that judicial review could potentially provide a claimant with a corrective
order and faster relief. Id. at paras. 35, 37. The SCC emphasized that “Ward directs [courts] to consider the
existence of alternative remedies, not identical ones[.]” Id. at para. 37.
322
Id. at para. 30.
323
See Fisher, supra note 185, at 37.
324
Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. British Columbia, 2020 SCC 13 (Can.).
325
Id. at 27–28. As Professor Emily Lewsen notes, Section 23 of the Charter provides Canadians “in
regions of Canada where either English or French is a minority language in relation to the other” and “whose
first language is or whose primary school instruction was in [English or French]” with “the right to have their
children receive a public education in that language.” Emily Lewsen, En Termes Pédagogiques: The Supreme
Court Issues a Long-Awaited Ruling that Clarifies and Invigorates Minority Language Educational Rights, 29
EDUC. & L.J. 239, 240 (2020). Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 23(1), Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
326
Lewsen, supra note 329, at 241.
327
Conseil scolaire francophone, 2020 SCC at para. 164 (emphasis added).
328
Id. at paras. 166, 173.
329
Id. at para. 172.

PRINCE_7.11.22

380

7/11/2022 10:47 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

legislation and government policies, the SCC emphasized that a law is “welldefined” and enacted through “a transparent public process[,]”330 while a
government policy is a broad category with “unclear limits[.]”331 These
differences persuaded the SCC not to extend the immunity to cover government
policies.332 The SCC ordered the Province to pay $6 million and $1.1 million in
Charter damages respectively for failing to sufficiently fund school
transportation and rural minority-language schools as required by Section 23.333
III. DISCUSSION
In the United States, narrowing the Bivens cause of action has left individuals
with no remedy for constitutional violations—both technical and those resulting
in cognizable harm—committed by federal officials.334 Under Canada’s
approach to Charter damages, individuals who suffer constitutional violations in
Canada have more paths to some form of relief.335 The following discussion
offers explanations for how and why those who seek a remedy in Canada are
more likely to obtain some relief, whether in the form of Charter damages or an
alternative remedy.
A. A Rigorous Analysis of the Legal and Practical Availability of Alternative
Remedies
U.S. Supreme Court precedent has suggested that remedies other than Bivens
are available to remedy a wrong, but in actuality those remedies may not be
available at all.336 As Professor Leah Litman argues, this is because the Court
does not take into consideration the “independent, formal legal standards” of
certain remedies or the “practical limits” that make those remedies unavailable
in certain situations.337 For example, in Abbasi, the Court considered the
“hypothetical”338 availability of injunctive relief or a writ of habeas corpus as

330

Id. at paras. 166, 173.
Id. at para. 173.
332
Id.
333
Id. at paras. 180–81.
334
See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
335
See, e.g., Conseil scolaire francophone, 2020 SCC at para. 334; Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC
27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 (Can.); Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (Can.).
336
Constitutional Remedies – Bivens Actions – Ziglar v. Abbasi, 131 HARV. L. REV. 313, 318–19 (2017)
[hereinafter Constitutional Remedies]; see Litman, supra note 5, at 1512. Litman refers to this as “disingenuous
substitution.” Litman, supra note 5, at 1512.
337
Litman, supra note 5, at 1512.
338
Pfander & Formo, supra note 153, at 746 n.137 (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858).
331
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supporting the denial of a Bivens claim.339 As for injunctive relief, under City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons340 the respondents would have had to seek an injunction
prior to their injury or show that they were likely to suffer from that injury again
in the future—which would have been functionally impossible—to have
standing.341 With regard to habeas petitions, the Court acknowledged that habeas
relief had not yet been held to apply to cases challenging a detainee’s conditions
of confinement, as opposed to a detainee’s confinement itself.342 Furthermore,
under the facts of Abbasi, the respondents alleged that they were under a
“communications blackout” and that “their families and attorneys did not know
where they were being held[.]”343 It is highly unlikely that the respondents would
have been able to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or seek injunctive
relief under these conditions.344 It is also worth noting that these remedies would
not have helped the respondents in their situation. As the dissent pointed out,
“[n]either a prospective injunction nor a writ of habeas corpus . . . will normally
provide plaintiffs with redress for harms they have already suffered.”345 At this
point in the litigation, the only remedy available to the respondents was
damages.346
On the other hand, the SCC engages in rigorous analysis of the alternative
remedies available to a claimant, paying attention to whether such alternative
remedies are (or were) in fact available in a particular case.347 In Ernst, the SCC
held Charter damages were not available against a quasi-judicial regulatory
board due to good governance concerns and the availability of judicial review
as an “alternative, and more effective, remedy[.]”348 In so holding, the SCC
evaluated the availability of judicial review specifically in the claimant’s case.349
The SCC highlighted the claimant’s argument that the Board’s decision to bar
her communications was an abuse of its discretion and a violation of her Charter
rights.350 The SCC analyzed that judicial review was an available, and not
hypothetical, remedy in this situation because judicial review is the “time-tested
339

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862; see Litman, supra note 5, at 1509–10.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); Litman, supra note 5, at 1513.
341
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111; see Litman, supra note 5, at 1513, 1515. Lyons held that past injury is not
sufficient to have standing to sue for injunctive or declaratory relief; instead, claimants must show that they are
likely to suffer an injury in the future. 461 U.S. at 111; see Litman, supra note 5, at 1513.
342
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63; see Litman, supra note 5, at 1514.
343
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1879 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Litman, supra note 5, at 1515.
344
See Litman, supra note 5, at 1515.
345
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1879 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
346
Id. at 1880.
347
See, e.g., Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
348
Id. at paras. 30, 41.
349
Id. at paras. 35–36.
350
Id. at para. 35.
340
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and conventional challenge to an administrative tribunal’s decision[.]”351
Although Charter damages would not be available under judicial review,352 the
SCC’s analysis concluded that judicial review could provide timely relief,
vindicate the Charter right, clarify the Board’s obligations under the Charter, and
deter future violations.353 Importantly, the SCC highlighted that Ward does not
require that alternative remedies offer the exact same relief as Charter damages,
just that they fulfill one or more of the functional objects of compensation,
vindication, and deterrence.354 In this way, the SCC effectively considers both
the practical availability of alternative remedies and their adequacy in ways that
the U.S. Supreme Court does not.
B. A Functional Analysis of Remedies
Under the Ward framework in Canada, the state raises the issue of alternative
remedies under step three (countervailing factors) to show that other remedies
are available to the claimant that would satisfy the functional objects of Charter
damages.355 The burden is on the state to show not only that alternative remedies
exist, but also that those remedies would “adequately meet the need for
compensation, vindication and/or deterrence” in that case.356 This framework
offers courts the flexibility to award Charter damages instead of, and in addition
to, other remedies to ensure a “functional approach” to remedying Charter
violations.357 Furthermore, the SCC highlighted in Ward that “[t]he existence of
a potential claim in tort does not [] bar a claimant from obtaining damages under
the Charter.”358 While the SCC emphasized that “double compensation” is not
permitted,359 the framework does give courts the ability to award Charter
damages and tort damages together in certain situations due to their different
functions.360 For example, in Carr v. Ottawa Police Services Board,361 the
claimant sued various officers and the Ottawa Police Services Board for
damages after the officers arrested her without a warrant, severely injured her,
351

Id. at para. 90 (Abella, J., concurring).
Id. at para. 37 (majority opinion).
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strip-searched her, and subsequently left her in a cell naked for hours.362 The
Ontario Superior Court held that the claimant was entitled to tort damages for
false arrest, false imprisonment, excessive use of force, and negligent
investigation in addition to Charter damages for the violation of her Charter
rights when she was left naked in a holding cell.363 The court reasoned that the
tort damages fulfilled the functional objective of compensation,364 while the
Charter damages fulfilled the goals of deterrence and vindication.365 Thus, the
framework promoted by the SCC enables courts to adequately vindicate the
Charter violation itself “as an independent wrong, worthy of compensation in its
own right.”366 As the SCC noted in Ward, sometimes “vindication or deterrence
[will] play a major and even exclusive role” in the awarding of Charter
damages.367
In contrast, Bivens jurisprudence makes clear that state tort law is sufficient
to displace a Bivens action altogether.368 In Minneci v. Pollard,369 the Court
considered whether a federal prisoner had a cause of action for damages under
the Eighth Amendment against employees of a federal private prison who failed
to provide him with necessary medical care.370 The Court denied the Bivens
action because the “claim focuse[d] upon a kind of conduct that typically f[ell]
within the scope of traditional state tort law”371 and the employees could be sued
under state tort law.372 The Court reasoned that state tort law was able to
adequately compensate the victim and deter the officer from violating the
Constitution.373 It did not matter that state tort law could impose limits on the
amount of recoverable damages or impose procedural hurdles to obtaining
relief.374 The Court stated that “the question is whether, in general, state tort law
remedies provide roughly similar incentives for potential defendants to comply
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with the Eighth Amendment while also providing roughly similar compensation
to victims of violations.”375
As John Preis points out, one concern regarding the incorporation of
alternative state law remedies into the Bivens analysis is that “a court hearing a
constitutional tort action will never be able to know with any certainty whether
state law will in fact provide a remedy.”376 If an individual’s Bivens claim is
dismissed due to an alternative state law remedy and the state law remedy turns
out not to apply, that individual would be left without any remedy whatsoever
for the violation of his constitutional rights.377 Unlike the framework in Canada
discussed above, the Bivens framework does not sufficiently prioritize the
remedial goal of vindicating the constitutional right.378
C. Another Kind of “Remedy”—Settlements and Apologies
Though not an “alternative remedy” within the meaning of Bivens and Ward,
one form of relief has developed in Canada for particularly heinous
constitutional violations—a settlement award and formal apology from the
Government of Canada.379 Specifically, there is a pattern of the Canadian
government settling claims with individuals who have been detained and
tortured abroad due, in part, to some action taken by the Canadian
government.380 Particularly relevant is the case of Maher Arar, who brought
cases against the governments of both the United States and Canada. The Bivens
action in the United States was denied, but Arar received a settlement and
apology from the Government of Canada.381
Upon information from Canada that Arar was affiliated with Al Qaeda,382
the U.S. government detained Arar at JFK airport, held him for almost two
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weeks in harsh conditions, and subsequently removed him to Syria for
interrogation and torture.383 Arar, a dual citizen of Canada and Syria, remained
in Syria for over a year while being tortured.384 The information provided to the
United States by Canada was later determined to be incorrect.385 After he was
released to Canada, Arar filed a Bivens action against various U.S. national
security officials for the violation of his substantive due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment.386
Prior to the resolution of his case in the United States, Arar requested an
official inquiry into his circumstances by the Canadian government to determine
what role Canada played in the situation.387 The inquiry was launched and a
report, which determined that Canada had given the United States incorrect
information, was published in 2006.388 In early 2007, Arar accepted a $9.75
million dollar settlement and formal apology from the Canadian government for
its role in his detention and torture.389
In Arar v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit denied Arar’s Bivens claim because
it found that “extraordinary rendition”390 was a new context and special factors
counselled hesitation,391 namely separation of powers principles and concerns
regarding national security and foreign relations.392 The Second Circuit
highlighted that there were many “alternative remedial schemes” regarding
immigration,393 including the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).394 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit
noted that the TVPA did not apply to Arar’s situation,395 and that the INA may
also have been unavailable to Arar because he claimed that he was barred from
seeking any relief during his detention.396 Ultimately, the Second Circuit
383
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refrained from deciding whether Arar had alternative remedies available to him
because it found that the Bivens claim was foreclosed due to special factors
counselling hesitation, regardless of the existence or absence of an alternative
remedy.397 Arar sought a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, but it
was denied.398
This case illustrates a stark difference between the United States and Canada.
Despite the obvious constitutional violations and egregiousness of this case, the
U.S. government, especially its court system, failed to supply Maher Arar with
any remedy.399 Bivens proved to be useless in compensating Arar and deterring
deplorable conduct by high level federal officials due to the restraints the U.S.
Supreme Court has placed on the doctrine.400 On the other hand, the Canadian
government admitted it was wrong, apologized, and attempted to compensate
the victim by providing him with almost ten million dollars.401 This is another
example of how individuals who seek redress in Canada for constitutional
violations tend to walk away with some type of remedy, while those in the same
situation seeking help from courts in the United States walk away with nothing.
IV. PROPOSAL
To decrease the instances in which individuals are left with no remedy for
violations of their constitutional rights by federal officials, the U.S. Supreme
Court should incorporate pieces of the SCC’s functional approach to Charter
damages into its Bivens analysis.402 Before finding that another remedy
forecloses the application of the Bivens doctrine, the Supreme Court should
follow the lead of the SCC by rigorously analyzing whether that alternative
remedy is both legally and practically available.403 For example, the Court
should ensure that the potential alternative remedies are not “hypothetical”404
due to some restrictive legal doctrine, such as the Lyons standing doctrine,405 or

397

Id.
Id. at 559.
399
Id.
400
See id. Moreover, this case occurred before the doctrine was further restricted by Abbasi and
Hernandez. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
401
See Austen, supra note 380; Fisher, supra note 185, at 123.
402
See Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28, para. 24 (Can.).
403
Litman, supra note 5, at 1512; see Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 3
(Can.).
404
Pfander & Formo, supra note 153, at 746 n.137.
405
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); Litman, supra note 5, at 1513.
398

PRINCE_7.11.22

2022]

7/11/2022 10:47 AM

BIVENS AND WARD

387

some factual limitation on the plaintiff’s ability to seek a remedy,406 as was the
case with both Abbasi and Arar.407
The SCC’s functional approach also analyzes the adequacy of an alternative
remedy.408 This approach ensures that whatever remedy the court awards is
targeted and able to redress the Charter violation at issue by focusing on whether
the alternative remedy would adequately compensate the claimant, vindicate the
Charter right, and/or deter unconstitutional conduct.409 In the past, the U.S.
Supreme Court robustly analyzed the differences in a Bivens remedy and an
alternative remedy.410 For example, in Carlson v. Green, the Court went through
the specific reasons as to why a remedy under Bivens was more effective than a
FTCA remedy.411 The Supreme Court should resurrect that careful analysis
while incorporating the SCC’s functional lens.
Under the Canadian framework, to negate a Charter-damages award on the
basis of an alternative remedy, the defendant must show that the other remedy
would adequately fulfill those goals.412 Similarly, the Supreme Court should
place the burden on the defendant to establish that whatever alternative remedy
the defendant proposes as sufficient is functionally justified. The mere existence
of an alternative remedy should not displace a Bivens action if the alternative
remedy is incapable of compensating the plaintiff and vindicating the
constitutional right at issue.
By incorporating these pieces of the Canadian framework, victims of
constitutional violations by federal officials would have a better chance of
securing a remedy for those violations. Of course, this proposal alone will not
drastically increase the access to justice under Bivens given the restrictive nature
of the Bivens doctrine as a whole. Nevertheless, these suggestions would still
improve plaintiffs’ prospects under the alternative remedies analysis, especially
for those whose claims fall within the recognized contexts of Bivens, Davis, and
Carlson.413
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CONCLUSION
Under the Bivens analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the
existence of potential alternative remedies since the doctrine’s conception.414
However, the Court has diminished its consideration of the adequacy and
practical availability of these alternative remedies to such an extent that many
individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated by a federal officer
walk away from a Bivens claim with no remedy at all.415 On the other hand,
individuals who seek a remedy in Canada are more likely to obtain some form
of relief to redress their violated Charter rights.416 To address this issue in the
United States, the Supreme Court should adopt a functional approach to the
alternative remedies analysis in line with the SCC’s approach to Charter
damages in Ward.417 By incorporating pieces of the SCC’s functional framework
into the Bivens analysis, the Supreme Court can better protect and vindicate
constitutional rights while ensuring more effective remedies for Bivens
claimants overall.
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